

DePauw University
Greencastle, Ind.
1100-1400, Friday, 11 November 1977

Wabash University
Crawfordsville, Ind.
1700-2100, Friday, 11 November 1977

SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE

A. Past ~~seven~~ months

- looking at/explaining past intel activities
- not exercise in burying/praising past
- value of looking at past makes you want to find ways to ensure mistakes/impressions of mistakes don't reoccur. All we do must rest on a solid foundation of the ethical/moral values of our nation.

B. Ethics

- Would like to write a formal code of ethics for the IC. Not an effort to restrict action, instead to try to help. We all have own personal code, but organizations must have standards too. Unexpressed, they can only be assumed. It really isn't fair to our employees to expect them to live up to standards which have not been made explicit.

- Problems:

1. Values hard to pin down; interpretations of national ethics change with time and circumstance.
2. Difficult to test acceptability of secret operations through public opinion. Consequently must attempt to judge what the nation wants today and will continue to approve tomorrow.

- ~~In doing so, whether or not a formal code of ethics can be written, the reassessment of our operations and their measurement against today's expressed ethics is worthwhile because:~~

- ~~a. it sensitizes the whole IC to the issues, and~~
- ~~b. it encourages public understanding of the real problems involved in trying to run an intelligence organization in accordance with the Marquis of Queensbury rules.~~

We do have some guidelines, however, - for instance on the

1. ~~Domestic side that is,~~ ^A activities involving U.S. citizens, in U.S.A., have easiest time.

- Most are closely controlled by law, e.g., new wiretap legislation. I'm sure you feel as I do - don't want to go to jail any more than any other citizen.

Balance

- In other cases we are regulated by Presidential order:
Assassinations.

- Finally, have our own regulations:

- a. Media.

Today - no paid contractual relationships with accredited American media are permitted. We don't use them as agents. However, do respect journalists as citizens. They have right to assist the government by passing on observations/information if they so desire. Nothing improper. Injurious freedom? press sharing -

- b. Clergy/missionaries

No secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationships permitted. None exist.

- c. Academia

Do have paid relationships - e.g., engage professors to write or do research for us. Afraid, however, the popular but unreasonable view in some areas of academe that any relationship between the academic and intell communities is improper. This had led to unhealthy reduction in the amount of contact. I hope to expand those relationships.

Let me dwell on this a bit as it is important, controversial, and not well understood.

I don't want to undermine academia:

- 1) By influencing curricula/teaching;
- 2) By tarnishing image.

Thus, we will not enter into paid or unpaid relationships which would prejudice teaching responsibilities nor will we use academic status of one of our associates to conceal his identity.

But within those limits still lots of room for association with the IC which need not call into doubt the authenticity and credibility of our educational institutions.

The enormous intellectual resources in our universities should be free to interact with government at all levels.

Recently, for instance, I asked an eminent Sovietologist to do some work for us. It would be a shame if he could not because of irresponsible pressures within the academic community. He will provide a degree of depth and perspective on the Soviet Union which it is difficult to find outside the academic community. At the same time he will become more valuable to his students by improving the depth of his understanding of how government actually operates in the Soviet Union. Even if he is not able to relate to his students the classified information he might acquire in this kind of exchange, unquestionably his insights and improved understanding will make his teaching more relevant and enhance his ultimate worth on the campus.

This raises the question -

If a relationship exists between an individual on campus for example and the IC, should the IC be obliged to reveal that relationship to the administration of the school and perhaps even to the public?

I believe it is the individual professor's right to associate with whomever he deems appropriate and I also believe it is his prerogative to reveal his relationships to his institution or not; just as you and I, he should be the final arbiter of who knows his personal business. Clearly the professor must have a conscience and perhaps the university some rules about what level of outside activity constitutes interference with his professional duties, but such rules should apply to all extra-teaching activities not just those with the CIA or other intelligence organizations.

Open publications

- 6 -

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Let me also point out that the benefits of IC and AC

working together is not a one way street. For instance in the field of archaeology, some parts of the world are inaccessible to archaeologists due to either geography or political climate. Aerial photographs can not only provide access to the inaccessible, they can reveal features which are either invisible or distorted to an observer at ground level. Ancient cities, fortifications, villas, roads, and other structures which have been eroded by time, destroyed by war, or in many cases vandalized can be revealed to the aerial camera. The Intelligence Community, because of its particular needs, has acquired a massive amount of photography useful to the academic community.

It would be a shame if this knowledge could not be shared because universities chose to levy rigid prohibitions on their faculty.

So in the United States, intell activity carefully circumscribed within a framework of both laws and regulations which protect the citizen.

Let me move on

2. Overseas and with respect to non-U.S. citizens, the problem of reflecting our nation's values in intelligence operations becomes much more of a judgmental question and one where the trade-offs must be weighed judiciously.

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- In open societies like ours it is relatively easy to keep abreast of trends/attitudes, foreign policy initiatives, and to be prepared for future events. Intelligence operations are largely a matter of shared confidences, reading the newspapers and journals, and keeping one's eyes open.

- In closed societies our need for good information about trends, policies, and intentions is just as great, while ability to acquire that information openly is severely limited.

Most extreme example, of course, is Soviet Russia. First society in our history with potential to literally destroy us. Need gain access to assure national security, e.g., SALT; but info: needed pertains wider sphere than purely military. Much more mundane and practical than that - 1972 grain deal.

Yet only access sometimes is through clandestine means.

Here, the benefits of gaining vital intelligence must be weighed against our fundamental preference to deal openly and honestly with our neighbors, and be as solicitous of the individual rights of foreigners as we are of our own citizens.

When does the need for good information
outweigh the desire to reflect American
values in everything we do. *Let me*

Clandestine collection *George*

and covert action are highly charged issues
in the eyes of the average American.

- People come to this issue with varied
backgrounds and prejudices: some wonder
why the U.S. should engage in any
clandestine action at all; others wonder
whether any clandestine action the U.S. takes
abroad could harm an important American
interest; still others, outraged at Soviet
electronic eavesdropping on U.S. citizens'
phone calls, or Korean payments to U.S.
Congressmen, but uncomfortable about the
basis for their outrage for fear CIA engages
in equivalent practices in the Soviet Union
and Korea, are confused.

- Clandestine gathering of information is a
tool used sparingly. There is always a
necessity for ascertaining that this
information is not available through overt

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or less risky sources. I assure you, however, that with all the wonderful new technical means we have today, clandestine spying is still a vital arrow in our quiver of intelligence gathering techniques.

- To what lengths should we go in pursuing information? To what limits should pragmatism override idealism? On whose judgment should we depend? Recall - operate largely in secret, public scrutiny cannot be our guide; we must find a surrogate process of public oversight. That has been one major result of past several years of scrutiny and criticism.

- Oversight

- (1) Personal interest of President/VP
- (2) Senate Select Committee
 - relations with IC are close and excellent
- (3) New House Committee
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- (4) Legal requirement for approval for covert operations

*Senate
Baugh
Lugar*

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(5) IOB

- Risk in all of this:

(1) Timidity - least common denominator

(2) Security leaks

But I believe in balance - next few
years critical

C. Limits on Public Oversight - More sharing - more in touch -
within limits of secrecy

Both - process of intelligence - how to do it -

And - Product - Energy - Soviet Economy

Sharing of value 2 public - even more help
Even within limits - Benefits - most important

relates to fact values are hard to pin down;

changing - hence must stay in touch with society,

not only through Congress, elected executive

branch and but also own contact with public.

- Where does this all lead?

o New American model of intelligence

- British model - Secrecy

- American model - balance - openness vs. secrecy

Out of this balance - 2 things

(1) Greater input from public to standards
expect IC

(2) Greater input from IC to public contributing
to a more informed debate on major issues.

This kind dialogue is the essence of the democratic process.

*Confident
conducting
stronger
open
society*

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